Procedural Reform by North Dakota Law Review
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 2 Number 10 Article 3 
1925 
Procedural Reform 
North Dakota Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
Recommended Citation 
North Dakota Law Review (1925) "Procedural Reform," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 2 : No. 10 , Article 
3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol2/iss10/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
BAR BRIEFS
PROCEDURAL REFORM
Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School lays down the
following canons of procedural reform:
1. "Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it must be made sub-
sidiary to the substantive law as a means of making the law effective in
action. That procedure is best which most completely realizes the sub-
stantive law in the actual administration of justice.
2. "There should be no such thing as an individual procedural right,
i. e., a recognized absolute claim to a procedural advantage merely as
such.
3. "The ideal of mechanical disposition of one narrow issue or of one
simple application for a specific remedy should be replaced by an ideal of
complete disposition of entire controversies in one proceeding in which
all the remedies of the legal system are available in order to give full
effect to the substantive rights of the parties. (Read this one over
again.)
4. "The ideal of appellate procedure should be not a separate pro-
ceeding in a distinct tribunal but an application for rehearing, new trial,
vacation, or modification, as the case may require, made in the same
cause before another branch of the same tribunal."
The more one hears or reads of the discussions by such competent
authorities as Dean Pound, the more is one impressed with these facts:
That lawyers as a group must deal with the question of procedural re-
form and that in order to deal effectively with the question of rule-mak-
ing power must be restored to the courts. It may be difficult to convince
the layman in the legislature that such power is inherent in the courts
or that it is properly placed there if not inherent, but the effort to con-
vince him should be made and that right speedily. (Since this was
written, the association has taken definite steps towards this end.)
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
First National Bank of Le Sueur v. Bailey et al. A note taken by a
grain commission house was sold to plaintiff bank for full value within a
reasonable time after its execution. The maker claims an agreement
with the commission house that the note should not be negotiated. The
president of the commission company was also president of the plaintiff
bank, but in selling the note to the bank another officer represented the
bank. In an action on the note it is claimed the bank is not a holder in
due course. HELD: When a holder of a negotiable instrument has shown
that the instrument was purchased before maturity, and for a valuable
consideration, he is presumed to be a holder in due course. When the
president and active manager of a brokerage company, acting for such
company, sells a negotiable note to a bank of which he is also president,
the cashier of the bank acting for the bank in the purchase of the note,
